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Abstract 
 
Drawing on interviews with migrant domestic workers and brokers in the Accra-Tema capital region 
of Ghana, this paper throws light on the everyday practices of brokers in producing ideal workers for 
urban middle class and expatriate families as well as overseas employment. The authors map the 
different kinds of brokers who are involved in the selection and placement of domestic workers and 
show how they filter and represent workers to potential employers. Women and girls from the poorer 
north and Volta regions are positioned into precarious employment with an ever-present risk of abuse, 
non-payment and sexual exploitation. In the absence of effective state protection these workers 
depend heavily on brokers for negotiating better working conditions and switching jobs if they are in 
a difficult position. By examining such dynamics the authors demonstrate how the process of 
brokerage itself offers these workers opportunities for exercising agency that have the potential of 
setting them on an upward path. The authors conclude with calls for a more-nuanced and 
differentiated understanding of the role and the practices of brokers to better inform Ghana’s efforts to 
minimise exploitation of domestic workers. 
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Introduction	
 
This paper offers empirical evidence on the ambiguous relations between brokers and migrants in the 
process of placing domestic workers and shaping them into ideal workers for middle class and 
expatriate families in urban Ghana as well as overseas employment. There is very limited information 
on the specificities of brokerage for international and internal migration in Ghana or indeed in Africa 
in general, and as such this is an important empirical contribution to the literature. Rural–urban 
migration from the poorer regions of Ghana to the south is an important part of the livelihood 
portfolio of less well-off families. For women and girls from such backgrounds, low-paid and 
insecure domestic work in urban areas of the south is a critical avenue of employment. International 
migration for domestic work is also on the increase, especially to the Gulf countries. Migration and 
entry into domestic work is often facilitated and sustained by an entire industry centred around 
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recruitment agencies and their chains of brokers but very little is know about their modes of operation 
and the impacts on migrants’ welfare. 
 
The growing importance of domestic work as a sector of employment in Ghana is connected to shifts 
in gender roles within relatively more wealthy families. Care work previously performed by female 
household members is being substituted with external domestic services (Osei-Boateng and 
Ampratwum 2011). The growing demand for domestic work in Ghana has been linked to a number of 
factors, including greater female labour-market participation and the absence of strong social policies 
that make it conducive for women to combine formal work with reproductive and domestic work 
(Tsikata 2009). This increasing demand for domestic workers is largely filled by migrant women who 
move from rural areas in search of jobs to support their families and save money for themselves 
(LAWA-Ghana 2003; Tsikata 2009). Domestic workers are believed to be a substantial segment of 
the workforce; studies show that there is at least one domestic worker per urban family and the more 
wealthy, larger families may employ as many as six (LAWA-Ghana 2003). Census data show that 
roughly 0.6 per cent of the economically active population was employed as domestic workers in 
2010, a figure likely to be an underestimation, given the difference in official definitions of domestic 
work and the domestic work not being formally recognised as work in Ghana (Awumbila et al. 
2012;). Domestic work has emerged as an important avenue of employment for migrant labour from 
African and Asian countries for similar reasons. There has been a marked increase in the employment 
of foreign domestic workers in wealthy homes which has occurred as more women in Middle Eastern 
countries have entered the workforce and with changing cultural conceptions of their responsibilities 
(Manseu 2006: 28). 
 
Employing a qualitative research approach, this paper examines the mediating role of brokers in 
facilitating the recruitment of rural migrants from the poorer regions as well as urban suburbs of 
Ghana into domestic work in Accra and abroad. It takes a deeper look at the nature of the social 
relations between migrants, employers and brokers and fills a critical gap in the understanding of an 
important yet under-researched phenomenon that is increasingly discussed in the context of workers’ 
rights and exploitation. While our findings corroborate many other studies that have shown how 
brokers perpetuate exploitation and produce a docile workforce, we show that recruitment agencies 
and brokers also play a range of multiple and often contradictory roles that straddle hazy boundaries 
between subjugation and empowerment. These activities can entrench patriarchal values and the 
subordination of female domestic workers, and also reinforce labour market segmentations where 
women from marginalised and poor ethnic groups are pushed into low-paid, precarious work. At the 
same time, brokers may also aid domestic workers to negotiate better terms and conditions of 
employment to meet their aspirations for personal development. Assisting migrants in this way helps 
to consolidate the reputation of brokers but also boosts their chances of survival in an increasingly 
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competitive market. Brokers and migrants are therefore part of a system that contributes to growing 
circuits of labour mobility that benefit them both.  
 
Conceptualising	brokerage	in	migration	
 
The literature tends to frame migrants using the facilitative services of brokers and intermediaries as 
passive and having no agency in setting their own migration agendas (Agunias 2009). Yet there is 
evidence from other parts of Africa that recruitment agencies, intermediaries and businesses involved 
in the migration industry can become an important part of migrants’ risk management strategies (de 
Haas 2007). However there is little empirical research on migration brokerage in Ghana and how 
aspiring migrants and brokers build trust to lay the foundations for complex and risky journeys. It is 
important to gain a grounded understanding of these processes in order to understand how those based 
in remote rural locations are able to access labour markets in destinations that are well beyond their 
normal cultural and social spheres of interaction (Lindquist, 2012). Others have also highlighted the 
critical role of brokers in connecting the local and the global, the peripheral and the central, and the 
poor and the rich (Agunias 2013; Kern and Müller-Büker 2015). It is therefore important to gain a 
more nuanced understanding of the role and practices of brokers as they navigate this multifaceted 
space in the recruitment process for migrant domestic workers. We examine how brokers manage the 
expectations of migrants looking for paid domestic work and employers and the role they play in co-
constituting precarity together with employers and, in the case of young migrants, together with their 
parents.  
 
Exploitation	in	domestic	work	
Much has been written about the specific vulnerabilities of domestic workers which arise from the 
intimacy and highly personalised relations among people (often women) from different backgrounds 
where boundaries of class and race are being established through a variety of control mechanisms. 
Common forms of control relate to the manner of dressing and whether this is “provocative” or 
“decent”, the extent to which makeup is applied, subduing body language, enforcing silence and 
demanding servile behaviour. For example in Hong Kong, Filipina workers must dress and do their 
hair according to their employers’ directives (Constable 1997, Anderson 2000). In more severe cases 
the employer may subject the worker to corporal punishment, restrictions on movement, control over 
communication, denial of personal time, scrutiny of sexuality and humiliating tasks which reflects the 
perception of their bodies as disposable, dirty and less human than their employers (Anderson 2000, 
de Santana Pinho 2015). Symbolic boundaries may also be drawn through enforcing inferior and 
cramped living quarters to protect the status of the family (Dickey 2000).  Indeed the testimony of 
domestic workers in Ghanain homes adds to this evidence. 
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Brokers’	role	in	precarizing	migrant	domestic	workers		
Rich accounts have recently emerged of the particular vulnerabilities of female domestic workers who 
migrate through brokers. For example, Fernandez’s study of brokerage of migrant domestic workers 
from Ethiopia travelling to the Gulf over land routes illustrates other extreme forms of exploitation 
and precarization such as being abandoned in the desert or being raped (Fernandez 2013: 828). 
Migrant domestic workers are clearly vulnerable to a variety of risks both on account of the 
particularities of domestic work itself but also because they are often placed through brokers who are 
well placed to exploit them. However rather than analysing the experiences of migrant domestic 
workers in Ghana through a risk and vulnerability lens, we invoke the concept of precarity as an 
analytical tool. Louis Waite’s conceptualisation of precarity and differentiation from risk and 
vulnerability helps us to apply a precarity lens to the situation observed in Ghana. She argues that 
unlike risk and vulnerability, precarity is useful in examining the structures of inequality that relegate 
certain groups of people to exploitative conditions but at the same time it provides room for the 
possibility of workers resistance to such conditions.  
.. the socio-political framing and conceptual depth of the term precarity encapsulates both a condition 
and a point of mobilisation in response to that condition, whereas risk and vulnerability generally 
refer to just conditions. (Waite 2009: 421). 
 
While we find Waite’s ideas helpful we also note that the acts of resistance and negotiation that we 
observe in our case study are individual, opportunistic and not organised in the way that workers’ 
movements might be. Not only that, as we discuss below, these individual acts may be undertaken 
with the help of a broker. The potential of such individual acts of resistance to transform the balance 
of power for domestic workers as a whole is unclear. But the role of the broker in acting as a conduit 
for information on bargaining strategies with employers has the potential to amplify their impact 
beyond the individual. Secondly precarity can also help us to situate the experience of migrant 
domestic workers in the historical and institutional context in Ghana, where migrant	 domestic	workers	 typically	 come	 from	marginalised	 regions	and	ethnic	groups	 (Tsikata	2009).	As Paret 
and Gleeson (2016) argue: 
“the central significance of the precarity concept lies in the way in which it connects the micro and 
the macro, situating experiences of insecurity and vulnerability within historically and geographically 
specific contexts.” (Paret and Gleeson 2016: 280). 
Such a conceptualisation of precarity can be used to understand how gender and ethnic hierarchies 
intersect with the organisation of paid domestic work and working conditions inside the homes of 
Ghana. As a concept, precarity is not new and has long been used to describe the casualization of the 
workforce in post-Fordist and post-welfare economies (Bourdieu1963, Standing 2011). Others have 
sought to understand wider unpredictability and precariousness of the human condition; Butler 2004 
in the context of post 9/11 America and Ettlinger 2007 who also described it as a generalised 
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“condition of vulnerability relative to contingency and the inability to predict” (320). Recent 
scholarship has blurred these boundaries of “labour” and “life” due to the difficulties of separating 
them and recognising their mutually constitutive nature (Strauss 2017; Paret and Gleeson 2016; 
Neilson and Rossiter 2005).  
 
In line with the focus of this special issue, our focus here is on examining whether and how brokers’ 
activities of selection, placement and subjectivation are linked to the precarization of domestic 
workers in Ghana. We are also interested in examining how brokers expand workers’ agency and help 
them achieve their personal goals for development. Several thick accounts exist of the role of brokers 
in identity ascription and subjectivation through the practices they engage in to supply “ideal” 
workers. For example Rodriguez and Schwenken 2013; Constable 1997 and Gardiner 2008 show how 
brokers perpetuate the production of the ‘ideal’ migrant domestic worker with qualities of deferential 
femininity, docility and subservience, so that she fits into specific labour-market niches at destination. 
Liang (2011) lists the stages in identity ascription, starting with the upgrading of skills, then the 
acquiring of a certain attitude and, thirdly, the essential ethics that are considered appropriate by the 
employers for ‘live-in maids’. These latter are trained to work very long days, obeying strict 
hierarchies, performing docilely and working under high pressure. There are marked similarities 
between the situation that Liang describes and what we encountered in Ghana. 
 
Conversely we also draw on insights from the interviews to show how domestic workers use brokers 
to challenge structures that keep them in positions of low-paid precarious work. As Constable (1997: 
203) has noted, domestic workers are rarely passive victims of oppression and they do engage in 
strategies to fight back. Gamburd 2000 (121) makes similar observations in her research on the 
migration of women for domestic work from Sri Lanka. Like Spener (2009), we challenge portrayals 
of brokers and intermediaries purely as a ‘migration business’ (Salt and Stein 1997) and frame 
migrants as playing a participatory role in the migration process and actively seeking out the services 
of migration ‘entrepreneurs’ or agents in fulfilling their own migratory agendas (Mahmud 2013; 
Spener 2009). Spener also observes that profit-centred and exploitation focused analyses do not 
expressly contemplate the social process through which migrants choose whose services to contract or 
how they negotiate migration ‘deals’ with the entrepreneurs whose services they contract (Spener 
2009: 13). In the coming pages we delve deeper into the issue of precarity and the production of the 
ideal internal and international female domestic migrant worker in the Ghanaian context to examine 
the different kinds of brokerage arrangements, where and how precarity is created and the role of 
brokers and other actors in that.  
 
Research	methodology	
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The study was conducted in Accra/Tema, the capital city region of Ghana, chosen because it is the 
most important migration destination for poor migrants from the north providing a good setting for 
understanding migrant-broker relations. Given the objective of delving deeper into the nature of this 
relationship, a qualitative research approach was chosen which would enable a deeper understanding 
of the experiences and behaviours of research participants (Creswell 2009, Paret and Gleeson 2017). 
The main method of data collection was in-depth interviews; altogether 76 respondents were 
interviewed, 23 formal and informal brokers and intermediaries of various categories, 24 domestic 
workers, 7 employers of domestic workers, 18 government agencies, trade unions and civil society 
organisations, 2 faith-based organisations, 2 travel and tour companies and 1 researcher. State 
officials of the relevant state institutions in the migration industry were purposively selected and 
interviewed as key informants for information on the regulatory framework of the industry. 
Snowballing was used to select brokers, employers and domestic workers. The limitations of 
snowballing, particularly the tendency to select only actors in similar networks (see Bryman 2012), 
was addressed by selecting several entry points to ensure variety in the categories of respondents. For 
instance, the criteria considered in selecting brokers include the mode of registration, the broker’s 
possession of a licence and the socio-demographic characteristics of persons recruited. Employers 
were selected in such a way in order to ensure that they came from different backgrounds in terms of 
educational level, occupation, type of intermediary used and type of contract. Similarly, the criteria 
followed to select domestic workers included socio-demographic characteristics, type of work, mode 
of recruitment, duration of service, number of employers worked for and contract status (verbal or 
written). 
 
Typology	of	brokers		
 
A multiplicity of actors are involved in the recruitment of domestic workers for internal and external 
placement. Brokers differ in terms of their adherence to state regulations and, in particular, to 
registration/licencing stipulations, administrative structures, recruitment processes used, motivations, 
fees charged and contract arrangements. As Lindquist (2012) notes, almost anyone with the ability to 
connect people from different cultures and inspire trust in their promise to find them a job can become 
a broker. Based on our empirical findings, we loosely classify brokers into three different types, while 
at the same time  recognising that boundaries can be blurred and one type of broker may depend on 
another. Furthermore, the typology we offer below present categories that are not exclusive i.e. the 
roles between them may overlap and an individual may inhabit more than one of these categories. 
Even those brokers that are registered with government and seemingly “above board” with their 
operations depend on local brokers who work completely outside the government system of 
regulations.  
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Type One brokers, we classify as formal fully registered recruitment agencies, who have registered 
their business with the Registrar General’s Department, and have a license to operate from the Labour 
Department. Type 1 brokers function like an employment exchange, advertising through formal 
channels, taking potential workers through formal registration processes, including a formal interview. 
They tend to deal with more skilled applicants, preferably those with some level of education (usually 
high school and above) and work experience.  They mostly supply workers to the Ghanaian Upper 
and middle class, expatriates, companies and overseas placements. They ostensibly operate within the 
confines of the law, including adhering to the minimum work age limit of 18 years. Most of them 
provide training in domestic skills. However they may rely on other brokers, who operate in an 
informal way  (Type 3) to scout for workers if they need to boost the “supply” of workers. 
 
Type 2 brokers, we classify as semi-formal partially registered agencies. These are brokers registered 
with the Registrar General’s Department, but do not have a license to operate from the Labour 
Department. Type 2 agents also tend to recruit domestic workers for middle- and higher-income 
Ghanaian and expatriate families in large urban centres or, for overseas employers, mainly in the Gulf. 
However, formal education is less important, although it may be required for specific employers. The 
recruitment process is less formal as well, with most workers being recruited through word of mouth. 
For example the spokesperson for the Leroy Recruitment Agency, which recruits mostly for middle- 
and upper-income families in Accra, indicated that she recruits through recommendations from 
domestic workers she had placed in jobs before. On the other hand Broadway Initiative Limited, an 
agency based in Nima, (a low-income area in Accra) recruits domestic workers, for both internal and 
external placement.  
 
Type 3 brokers cover a wide group of individual informal recruiters and their sub agents. They are 
neither  registered with the  Registrar General’s Department nor possess a licence to operate from the 
Labour Department. This category also includes networks of families and friends who recommend 
family members for recruitment. Type 3 brokers operate within the confines of informality and non 
regulation and operate often as interlocutors for migrants, their families and prospective employers. 
They tend to recruit mainly form rural areas, matching workers to employers’ requirements with an 
emphasis on subservient behaviour, honesty and “decent” character.  Their “informality” and 
therefore accessibility makes them attractive to a majority of domestic workers as well as employers.  
 
As per our typology above, Type 1 are fully compliant with government regulations and are mediating 
relations between the state, the migrants and employers; partially registered Type 2 brokers who are 
connecting mainly migrants and employers and Type 3 who are mainly unregistered and unregulated 
who often act as the link between  migrants, their families and prospective employers.   
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Formal labour-recruitment requirements in Ghana are stringent in terms of the registration and 
acquisition of a licence to operate. For instance, the Labour Act of 2003 (Act 651, Article 7) and the 
Legislative Instrument of 2007 (LI 1833) both prohibit agencies from recruiting labour, whether for 
internal or external placement, without a licence. Despite these legal provisions, a large number of 
brokers in Ghana are either only registered with the Registrar General’s Department – but without 
having obtained the appropriate licences from the Labour Department to operate – or have neither 
registration nor licence to operate. Non-compliance is ostensibly due to the length of time it takes to 
register a company, the bureaucratic hurdles in the form of absentee officials and the demands for 
bribes which delay registration. However it is possible that not being registered opens up possibilities 
for employing under 18s who are in much demand in Ghanaian middle class families. A key point of 
differentiation is that while for Type 1 brokers responsibility is limited mainly to the recruitment/ 
placement, types 2  and 3 amaintain varying degrees of responsibility for the welfare of the migrant 
domestic worker even after placement.  This link between the broker and worker is especially strong 
in type 3  agencies and includes providing guidance during the recruitment, transit and placement 
process, character references for employers, advising on money management, helping with career 
progression and long term aspirations. Although we identify these three typologies, we focus at length 
in this paper on types 2 and 3 brokers, as the majority of domestic workers tended to use these brokers.  
 
There has been a sharp rise in the number of type 1&2 agencies from only 3 in the mid-2000s to 
nearly 200 that recruit domestically and another 19 that recruit for employers abroad as of 2015 
(Labour Department 2015). This indicates a growing market at the higher end that caters to skilled 
migrants for international clients as well as wealthy or corporate employers in the city. However they 
also rely on type 3  brokers to find them clients from hard to reach informal settlements in urban areas. 
Both Types 1 and 2 prefer urban workers and were often reluctant to engage new arrivals from rural 
areas – whom they refer to as ‘village people’. They limited themselves to producing ideal migrants 
for wealthy Ghanaians and international clients. The task of training up and placing rural women and 
girls who were yet uninitiated into urban ways of conducting themselves was left to Type 3  brokers.  
Recruitment processes for the informal brokers (Type 3) are more informal, grounded in the places 
and spaces of everyday life. Advertising is mainly through word of mouth, in places of worship 
(mosques and churches) and via previously placed domestic workers. These brokers also employ sub-
agents who scout rural areas for potential workers. Informal agents recruit from a wider pool of 
potential workers including those under 18 years of age and we found that this is one of the main 
reasons that they survive in the labour market despite government efforts to delegitimise them. For 
some such as the Hammani agency, which has an overtly Christian ethos, this was a source of pride 
and as their representative told us they are happy to recruit girls who are under the age of 18 and show 
them a ‘decent and honourable’ way of making a living. Hammani seeks to mould the girls’ behaviour 
to being appropriate for teenaged girls. The agency was started in one of the Pentecostal churches by a 
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female church member who claims her ‘calling’ was to help the poor, especially the elderly, orphans 
and young women who could not make it in life. Being completely unregistered, Hammani is able to 
recruit and place under 18 year olds.  
 
By contrast is the case of Alex an individual broker whom we  classify as a type 3 broker. He works 
as a security guard for an expatriate enclave but also has a business on the side as a broker for 
migrants from rural areas. The business grew from occasional requests from his employers to find 
them a “unspoilt and innocent” maid from the village and has now become a large, established 
enterprise. Personal bonds of trust, reciprocity and respect are at the heart of Alex’s business, which is 
built on the relationships that he has established with people he has placed in jobs. He also relies on 
personal recommendations from employers who have used his services. Alex’s model of recruitment 
is to charge the employers to find a suitable match and to ask the workers to give him something, 
based on goodwill and gratitude. He describes his business as an organisation that serves the poor. He 
says he will help girls from disadvantaged backgrounds find jobs in the city and act as a guarantor 
(more on this below) for them even if they do not pay him. His motivations are clearly morally 
ambiguous and even if no money is exchanged immediately as is the case with Alex and his clients, 
the relationship and the claims for reciprocation that might be called on at a later date are clearly 
understood by both parties. Osella and Osella (2009) note a similar ambiguity in patronage underlying 
brokerage arrangements in India. There may even be no money exchange at all and the only payment 
is in kind by recognising the standing of the broker as socially powerful and publicly displaying this 
recognition to others in the community (de Neve 2014). 
 
It was evident from the interviews with domestic workers that many from rural areas had migrated 
through informal brokers and trusted them to find the best deal for them as the case below illustrates. 
I went to see a woman called Grandmother, she is the aunty of the man I was to work for.  She easily 
gets jobs for people. My friend gave her number to me. (Cynthia, 29,domestic worker). 
 
I called John and he asked me to come. When we met, he asked me what job I wanted and I said house 
help. He explained to me that for Ghanaian homes, many domestic workers do general work. And so 
he found out from me if I would take such jobs. He also told me that foreigners employ many domestic 
workers for the different types of jobs. They could have a nanny, cleaner and a cook in the same 
house. After the explanation, I then indicated my preference. He sent me to the house himself. But I 
wasn’t part of the salary negotiation. Usually if the salary is not good, he would find another place 
for you (Livia, 40, domestic worker). 
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We discuss below the way in which brokers co-create precarity; while constructing ideal female 
domestic workers for work in the city or abroad.  
 
Constructing	“good”	girls	for	urban	work	
 
Type 3 brokers play a critical role in placing girls from poor backgrounds in domestic work among 
wealthy families in the city. Hammani Recruitment Agency which seems to work exclusively with 
new arrivals in the city sees it as their responsibility to ensure that the appearance and behaviour of 
workers meet the expectations of the employers. Their emphasis is on stripping the girls of their 
ethnic identity and village ways and recasting them into urban working-class girls.  
We teach them how to talk. When they come from the villages everything annoys them so we tell them 
that this is not how we live in the city. In the city, when you see an elderly person or a child, you say 
‘Please’. We introduce them to three key words that would help them – ‘Please’, ‘Sorry’ and ‘Thank 
you’. ‘Whenever you want to talk you use “Please”; when somebody gives you something you say 
“Thank you Mummy” or “Thank you Daddy’ to show appreciation and also if anything goes wrong 
and you are being questioned you say “I am sorry, I won’t do that again”’ and it ends it all. We also 
teach them table manners, how to make beds, folding bed sheets, ironing and other things. 
They also instil the idea that the girls should not have time of their own and surrender themselves to 
the job. 
We don’t encourage that (negotiating days off) because what will you be doing when you are off?  
You are being paid well, housed, fed and taking this huge sum as a salary, so why would you ask for 
days off? You expect your employer to treat you well but you don’t want to return that favour – what 
are you going home to do?  
Alex, the individual Type 3 broker, also has an informal system of training which emphasises the 
behavioural aspects of the job including learning how to speak ‘respectfully’ to their employers, ‘how 
to greet their superiors, desist from stealing’, he explains. 
Brokers are also aware of strong preferences among employers related to ethnicity; they may ask 
women to suppress their ethnic identities and behaviour to find a job but on the other hand they also 
play to stereotypes related to ethnic identities when they look for workers. As a representative of 
Leroy Services put it:  
People mostly don’t trust the Ewes [the third-largest ethnic group in Ghana, mainly from the Volta 
region] partly because of the fear of juju (voodoo). You would be amazed about how many 
enlightened people will tell you that. Yes, the Ashanti girls are loud and lazy, yeah a lot of people 
don’t like them… People prefer Fantes, Akuapems, yeah. Central and Western regions. Oh, Akuapems 
are polite, do you know what I mean?  
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Dela, a 23 year old migrant from Biriwa, a fishing and farming town in the coastal district of 
Mfantsiman provides testimony on such discriminatory attitudes. She describes how her employer 
tells her to speak in her (the employer’s) language and that “when I speak in my native language it 
shows a sign of disrespect.” Yet it is invariably girls belonging to historically disadvantaged 
communities that urban middle class employers seek as they can invoke long established cultural 
hierarchies to assert their superiority. The most sought after are “untainted” or inexperienced girls 
who have no social networks or knowledge of their rights and support systems in the city so that they 
cannot argue back and escape the treatment that is being meted out to them. In fact it is the ability to 
supply such workers that makes informal brokers so attractive to employers as one of the interviews 
show. 
We don’t just go in for anybody. We go in for people who are recommended by someone who is well 
known. That is why you contact someone whom you trust to get you someone whom he or she trusts. 
You don’t just pick them from the street. I know there are agencies that can provide you with a worker 
but I have not utilised their services before because they actually don’t know the background of the 
domestic workers. These job-seekers just approach them and express their interest in working as 
domestic workers, so all they do is to train them and give them to a household. The probability that 
the worker they would give you would not be up to your standards is high so I usually prefer the 
informal recommendations to the agency recruits.  
	
Character	references		
 
Obtaining character references thus becomes critical for finding a job as a domestic worker. This is 
especially important for girls who leave home without the permission of their guardians. The broker 
vouches for the girl/woman’s “character” by assuring the employer that she is not a thief and will not 
seek sexual liaisons with the man of the house, that she is clean, obedient and hardworking. In doing 
so he is speaking to widely held beliefs among urban middle class Ghanaians about the bodily 
attributes and behaviours of the poor, especially those who belong to ethnic groups from the northern 
and Volta regions of the country. As noted at the start of the paper, constructing domestic workers in 
ways that emphasise their inferiority and their bodies as promiscuous and sources of labour that can 
be exploited has been documented in research from other parts of the world (De Santana Pinho; 
Anderson 2000).  
 
Placing	into	exploitation	
 
While brokers insisted that they wanted to protect their wards against exploitation, their role in 
placing women and girls in highly exploitative work arrangements and thus playing a key role in 
reproducing structures of inequality was evident. Interviews with domestic workers provide disturbing 
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details of the level of servitude and limits to freedom that they experience. Cynthia, teenaged worker, 
summed up her day’s work, which was typical of many of the live-in workers we interviewed. 
I iron her bedsheet and scrub her bathroom every day.  I do the same in her children’s rooms. We 
change the sheets and towels in the house every Monday. When the cook is not around I take over the 
cooking. I make sure the children are fed as well as their parents. I remove and scrub the sun screen 
on their sliding doors and windows every two weeks. I machine wash the clothes of the children and 
iron afterwards. I wash her panties and iron as well. I also wash her bras. … I don’t have specific 
hours of work. As I said earlier on I can work the whole day and close at dawn. If I am lucky and they 
go out around 7 or 8, I know they will be back after 12 pm so I can go and sleep. Before I leave I have 
to sweep and mop the kitchen, check if all the windows and doors were locked.  
After meals, she will not allow me to leave to my room.  She claims she might need something so I 
have to sit and wait. When its 10 pm I go and ask if she will need my assistance; she normally asks me 
to send water to her husband or prepare some green tea for her. When we organize parties we do not 
sleep early, that is when I said we sleep after 3 am. 
 
The precarity created by limits on freedom, long hours and backbreaking work was compounded by 
constant threats of dismissal. This would be terrifying for workers with few sources of support in the 
city. Another domestic workers described how she was always presumed to be the thief if anything 
went missing and how she lived in constant fear of being handed over the police or being fired. 
She wrongfully accused me of stealing her dollars which she had kept in her purse. Before this 
incident she was always complaining of her things going missing.  When this happens I have to run 
and help her search for the item. She usually says I am the only stranger in the house because the rest 
of her house members will not do that. She did not have any idea about her children’s smoking 
(marijuana) habit. The children invite their other affluent friends to the house to smoke, it is likely 
they stole the money. Some other times, she would not carefully search the item before announcing it 
is missing. She usually finds them later on; sometimes she tells me other times she keeps it to herself.  
Such strategies reinforce the totality of the power the employer has over the body and survival of the 
worker. A bad reference from an employer can adversely impact on the possibility of finding another 
job. But here too as we discuss later in the paper, brokers can be an important source of support and 
assist workers to escape situations of extreme control and degrading treatment.  
 
Co-creating	precarity	with	parents		
Ironically the worst cases of precarization were seen when parents used the services of brokers to 
place very young girls in work. This was seen most often in extremely poor families; where single 
women were struggling to feed their children or where the father had remarried and there was conflict 
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between stepmothers and daughters. Often the girls are persuaded by their parents to go to the city on 
the promise of continuing with their education and earning money for themselves. But the tragic 
accounts below show that their employment conditions are extremely exploitative and promises are 
rarely kept.  
 
At the age of 13, Kay was told to migrate to Accra by her parents through a broker known as Aunty 
Aba (Type 3). Aunty Aba found a family through another broker, Sister Evelyn. I knew I was going to 
continue my education. So I told my mother that I will go to school (in Accra).  I also told my mother 
that if everything will be okay then I will go. She said that the sister who is taking me will take care of 
me. When I came I took only few clothes. The sister asked me why I took only few clothes. I told her 
that my mother said I should take few things so they will buy new things for me. But far from being 
treated well, she was subjected to cruel treatment on a regular basis, beaten for the slightest reason.    
Sometimes when I do something bad, then the madam will slap me [crying].  If she sends me, and I 
come back and I don’t bring the right thing, she slaps me. .. There was a day I went to bath, when I 
finished bathing, there was blood in the bath and I didn’t know. She called me and ask why. By the 
time I explain, she slapped me. Her precarious situation is compounded by the lack of support from 
her family. If I report to my daddy (employer’s husband), he will say that it is my fault. And the 
woman tells the man to tell my father to come and take me away. So my father came and pleaded with 
them and they took me back. 
 
The inability of the parents to support the girl and their extreme poverty created the conditions for 
such extreme exploitation. Even in our small sample, there were several such cases where desperately 
poor parents see domestic work in city as one of the few “decent” jobs where their child will be fed 
and housed. It is not clear from the interviews whether and how much the brokers were paid or what 
their incentives were for acting in this way. It was also not clear whether the earnings from the worker 
were being sent to the parents. Girls were often told that their earnings were being saved for them and 
would be given to them at the end of their employment but this sometimes did not happen and became 
source of conflict between the domestic worker and the employer. The collusion between brokers and 
the girls’ families created a situation of precarity which could, if left unchallenged, trap the girls in 
poverty and dependency for the rest of their lives. Next we discuss the dynamics of recruitment for 
international migration which has grown by all accounts and has become a source of concern for the 
government due to reports of maltreatment1.  The accounts below show the differences in which 
recruitment for international and internal migrants differs and how both kinds of brokers are involved 
in different kinds of identity formation and work with a different set of aspiring migrants.  																																								 																					1	joint	statement	issued	by	several	ministries	and	the	International	Organization	for	Migration,	for	International	Migrants	Day	in	2016	https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/press_release/file/IOM-Joint-Statement-14-Dec-2016.pdf	
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Producing	the	good	international	migrant		
Recruitment for international migration for domestic work appeared to take place in certain pockets of 
low-income settlements in Accra where brokers specialising in international migration were active. It 
was difficult to determine from the interviews whether the agents were operating completely outside 
the formal system by linking up directly with other brokers in the Gulf. They recruit mainly urban 
residents, either those who have always been in the city or those who have been there for a number of 
years. Those with experience of working for expatriates in the city are in great demand. This 
preference reflected brokers’ conceptualisation of what employers want in terms of behaviour and 
knowledge of the workings of wealthy families. Broadway, a type 2 agency in the informal settlement 
of Nima, plays an active role in selecting and training women for employment in Gulf countries. They 
select workers based on requirements communicated to them by brokers in destination countries who 
have an understanding of “what Arabs want” (cf Osella 2014). Communication technology such as 
Skype and Whatsapp have made it possible to tailor the ‘production’ and ‘supply’ of workers to match 
the requirements of employers. Although the agency claims to perform a social service and invokes a 
moral obligation to their clients, the commodification of workers and the near-absence of a moral 
sense of responsibility is evident from this statement:  
So it is like exchange by barter. We recruit them here, we give them to our colleagues over there and 
they too finalise their activity by sending them to the families. ….You send them from here, you take 
them to the office and the office distributes them.  
They check credentials, train and counsel migrants about working norms at destination before 
departure. The agency prides itself not only on supplying good workers but as being respectable 
representatives of the country. Agencies like Broadway epitomise neo-liberal ideologies of the “good” 
migrant as one who prioritises servitude over their own personal freedom and remits money back for 
the good of the country. “We let them know that they are there to work hard and to project a very high 
image of Ghana. So we tell them ‘Don’t just go and think, because you are in a white man’s country, 
you can just do what you like.” 
Instilling such rules into the minds of women prepared them for employment in a context where 
domestic workers enjoy few rights and liberties and the risk of abuse is high. As Manseau (2006) 
observes workers are vulnerable to exploitation by employers, government officials and recruiters through 
various means including financial, physical and sexual exploitation. Heavy borrowing to pay brokers may place 
them in debt which forces them to enter debt bondage and slave-like working conditions. Furthermore the 
working conditions inside homes have been compared to prisons because of the isolation and absence of legal 
protection and social networks  (Manseau 2006: 33). The denial of rights was clear from the interviews. 42 
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year old Jani changed her mind about migrating when she heard from her friend how she had been 
deceived by brokers about the conditions at destination.  
“The report from my friend was a bad one so I changed my mind about going…When my friend got 
there she told me that after about 2 to 3 months they told her they will pay an amount equivalent to 
500 cedis as against the 1,100 cedis equivalent promised. They took her passport and her phone. The 
phone is given to her only on Sundays.” 
Despite such reports and the undeniable role of brokers in positioning migrants in exploitative and 
precarious working conditions, agencies like Broadway appear to be thriving. This is symptomatic of 
a context where women and girls from disadvantaged backgrounds are not adequately protected 
against exploitation from unscrupulous agencies and not provided with meaningful employment 
within the country.  
	
Offering	protection	in	the	city		
Unsettling the above narrative are the ways in which brokers might help migrants to further their own 
agendas. Brokers like Alex help new arrivals in the city by providing them with a place to stay and 
while this could be theorised as part of the process of recruitment where he has the power and control, 
it can also be seen as protection against risks in the city. Having come from a poor background 
himself, he is aware of the help that new arrivals in the city need and he offers them assistance with 
settling in.  
I normally meet the person at the bus station and take them straight home. Most of them do not know 
their way around Accra and that is why I have to meet them to send them to their various work places. 
Sometimes they call me asking for my support to travel to the South. For example, a girl travelling 
from the Volta Region to Accra; I can talk to the GPRTU driver in the Volta Region, informing him 
that I will be the one to pick the girl up from the station. In that case he brings the girl without pre-
payment and I have to pay for the transport immediately she arrives.  
Switching jobs, negotiating working conditions, amplifying agency 
Alex also helps domestic workers to switch jobs to improve their wages and working conditions. He 
channels information about job availability and the bargaining strategies that other workers have used 
with his help or with the help of other brokers known to him. Through such activities Alex and 
brokers like him are supporting and perhaps amplifying individual acts of resistance and bargaining.  
One domestic worker explained how this works. I went to work with some Indians at Tesano. One day 
she told me I stole egg and I told her in my tradition, we do not steal egg. Even though I was not 
cooking, she accused me of stealing her tomatoes. I complained that I did not like the things she was 
accusing me of. Sometimes, I could be in the kitchen and she would go to my room and ransack 
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everything saying she was looking for missing items. I told Mr Smith and he advised me to cope it 
until he finds a different job for me. So he got another job for me at Kokomlemle (Nao, 28 year old 
domestic worker). 
Alex also helps workers move on to better jobs or get a “promotion” He says: 
For instance, some start as cleaners or home helps and are able to learn how to cook. Within two or 
more years they leave to move to other places. After two years, when they have learnt other things, I 
recommend them to other places – like in the Indian companies – as cooks and they get higher wages. 
Arguably this does have the potential to change the terms of employment for domestic workers as a 
whole if other brokers are involved in similar activities. Recall that Alex’s motivations to enter 
brokerage were a combination of profit but also a reaffirmation of his standing and reputation as a 
“big” and “generous” man in the city. The help that he offers his clients reflect this. Additionally he 
also, through his chains of sub-agents, reassures the parents of the girls that he will ensure that they 
send remittances home. By offering migrants with support in the city and parents with assurances of 
their safety and remitting, he can demonstrate and perform his role of being a patron who should 
command respect. Other brokers offered to mediate discussions on working conditions and wages. 
Phedelis Plus Recruitment Agency provides an example of the importance of recruitment agencies in 
negotiating and ensuring that the employee receives reasonable wages for their experience, age and 
the amount of work to be performed: 
“Let’s take for instance you want someone around 40 years to do house chores and take care of your 
children. At that age, for the person to be paid 300 Cedis is not fair. Or assuming you wanted 
someone with 4 years experience or more, you can’t pay that person a meagre salary. So we actually 
negotiate well to get fair payment for them. If we do not do the negotiation well, sometimes, the 
workers come back to us complaining that the salary is not good compared to the kind of work they 
are doing.” 
Another area where recruitment agencies played a key facilitation role was in the area of work 
conditions and specifically with the issue of “off days”. Matching the expectations of the employer 
with those of the domestic workers was often problematic and recruitment agencies played a key role 
in mediating these expectations.  As stated by Phedelis Plus agency: 
“Normally we tell the employers to be flexible. If the person is going for an off day you have to allow 
him/her. If you won’t allow them then you have to pay some allowance to him. So we do negotiate 
between the employer and the workers” 
“You send somebody to a place and maybe the agreement was that he/she was supposed to stay at 
work till Friday and go away on weekends but maybe the employer will say I want you to stay 
Saturday and Sunday.  Then we draw their attention that in order for the person to stay on Saturday 
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and Sunday, you need to pay extra to the person.  If the person doesn’t agree, you can’t force him or 
her”. 
This was also seen most often among brokers working with new arrivals from the village who 
(according to the brokers) were not fully aware of their “market value”. Despite the commodification 
that this implies, the brokers were prepared to negotiate on behalf of their wards whom they felt it was 
their duty to protect. By performing the role of protector in this way, brokers were able to enhance 
their own social standing. 
There was some evidence that the power dynamics between workers and brokers did change over 
time. While this was to be expected as workers became more experienced, better connected and 
knowledgeable about ways in which they could bargain with their employers, there were aspects of 
this that were aided by brokers. Those at the top end of the market with qualifications and job 
experience and deemed to be capable of taking on the best jobs can “call the shots” as the 
conversation with the Director of Leroy Business Solutions (a Type 2 agent) shows: 
She has junior high school qualifications. She’s very enlightened, extremely enlightened and she told 
me clear-cut ‘Madam, I am not interested in any salary under 500Ghs (£98.04)’. And you know that 
she’s got what it takes to do the job. She’s got good references. In fact some of the staff call the shots.  
	
Conclusions		
 
The above discussion thus highlights the multiple and often contradictory roles played by the different 
categories of brokers, who facilitate both the migration and the placement of migrants into domestic 
work in Accra. It also indicates a complex plethora of social relations between recruitment agents, 
domestic workers and their employers, which often have mixed outcomes, sometimes working to 
entrench the status quo and sometimes providing opportunities for domestic workers. 
 
This research on the role of brokers in the labour market for migrants seeking domestic work shows 
the diversity of agencies and individuals involved in terms of their legal status, modes of operation 
and client base. This corroborates Lindquist’s (2012) broadening of the notion of who can act as a 
broker. Fully registered agencies operate by the book and assess workers mainly on formal 
qualifications and experience. On the other hand informal agencies and individuals are heavily 
involved in moulding prospective workers to fill specific niches in the labour market abroad as well as 
within the country which demand subservient, docile, polite, hardworking and asexual beings. As our 
title suggests, by training domestic workers to say “Please, Thank You and Sorry”,  brokers are 
involved, to varying degrees, in subjectivation as they train workers to suppress their own identities 
and behaviour and conform to the expected behaviour of a subservient, polite, docile class of 
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domestic workers in urban areas. Brokers thus play a key role in the production of the “ideal migrant”.  
The accounts of working conditions show the exploitation that is inherent in domestic work spaces 
and the relations that define them. Employers use a variety of tactics to control and humiliate workers, 
and remind them of the precarity of their existence through threats of termination of the arrangement. 
Brokers are thus an integral part of the system that keeps women and girls from poor rural 
backgrounds in rural areas in precarious subordinate positions. On the flip side, informal brokers 
provide other services such as help with settling in urban areas, mediating disputes, negotiating better 
wages and working conditions, switching jobs and counselling the workers on the wise use of 
earnings. These functions contribute to fulfilling the long-term goals of personal development for 
migrants. We therefore urge the need for a more-nuanced, more-differentiated understanding of the 
role and the practices of brokers and intermediaries as they navigate the multi-faceted space in the 
recruitment process for migrant domestic workers. This is especially important as efforts to regulate 
the domestic-work sector in Ghana intensify.  
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